Wow, this case has one of names where an organization is making its longevity known by the un-PCness of its name (see also NAACP). The headline writer’s version of this case is that “California Courts OK ‘Me Too’ Evidence.” That’s nothing really new at the trial court level, at least in some courts. Precisely, however, this just says that the ‘me too’ evidence defeats or can defeat a summary judgment. That’s different than a jury instruction saying it proves it—which the Court here goes out of its way to say it does not: it’s relevant, not conclusive. The reason this causes so much angst is because it seems awful prejudicial to let this stuff in.
Also, look at the bottom of page 2 and on to 3. The Court of Appeal is saying that there were objections to the ‘me too’ decs, but that the trial court never ruled on them and it was ‘implicitly’ accepted. The trial court DID later file an attorney’s draft saying that the objections to the decs were sustained. Now the Court of Appeal says there in and that should have turned around the summary judgment. I’m not sure what to make of that apparent digression—all they have to do is say it should be in. They’re not saying it would’ve been out if the trial court would have said so in the first place… are they?
Maybe they just wanted the chance to say this:
[H]ere we can say as a matter of law that the “me too” evidence presented by the plaintiff in the instant case is per se admissible under both relevance and Evidence Code section 352 standards.
And again, they add:
Dissimilarities between the facts related in the other employees declarations and the facts asserted by plaintiff with regard to her own case go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.
The problem is, I kind of agree with the old Beyda court—if a jury hears this, it might be TOO probative… is this part saying the ‘me too’ evidence is per se admissible (at least under the circumstances set forth here, which are nothing really that special) going too far? I guess we’ll see if this one goes up.
